In real applications, data envelopment analysis (DEA) models with Russell measures are widely used although their theoretical studies are scattered over the literature. They often have seemingly similar structures but play very different roles in performance evaluation. In this work, we systematically examine some of the models from the viewpoint of preferences used in their Production Possibility Sets (PPS). We identify their key differences through the convexity and free-disposability of their PPS. We believe that this study will provide guidelines for the correct use of these models. Two empirical cases are used to compare their differences.
Introduction
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a systematic approach for analyzing the performance of organizations and operational processes, which was first proposed by Charnes, et al. (1978) , based on economic theory and linear programming. The DEA models can facilitate comprehensive measurement using input/output data to evaluate the relative efficiency of decision making units (DMUs) without a prior knowledge of input/output functions and weights. Now there are numerous theoretical and empirical researches into the DEA method, which has been extended to many areas, including private sectors and public sectors. Its theories and applications can be found in various In the original DEA models, the radial measures were used. Later on the Russell measures were found to be useful, see Fare and Lovell (1978) for an early study of efficiency measures, and remark in Bogetoft and Hougaard (1999) , Levkoff Tone (2001) , Zhu(1996) , Zhu(1998), and Zhou, et al.(2013) , which can be used to measure the non-radial part of efficiency.
There are many different DEA models with the Russell measures in the literature.
It is often confusing in empirical applications as which should be applied, as although often having seemingly similar structures, they have in fact very different emphases in empirical applications as to be seen later. Therefore, there is a need to examine their characteristics to provide useful advice for the empirical applications. In this work, we will systematically study them from the viewpoint of the preferences used in their Production Possibility Sets (PPS) since a DEA model is essentially determined from its PPS and measure. We find that some of the Russell DEA models use the Pareto preference in their PPS as in the classic DEA models with the radial measure so that their emphasis is to measure non-radial part of efficiency in empirical applications.
However, we find that the other Russell DEA models use very different preferences in their PPS, and then their emphasis is not to measure the non-radial part of efficiency, but to measure some compensable sums of the relative measures of the input/output components. Thus one uses them whenever one wishes to compare some total sums of input/output componets, rather than their individual components (more details are in Section 6). Therefore, we are able to provide some useful guidance for using (or not using) which DEA models with the Russell measures in empirical studies.
The structure of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, we will introduce some DEA models with Russell measures. In Section 3 we will discuss the convexity and free-disposability of the PPS for general preferences. Then in Section 4 we examine the convexity and free-disposability of the PPS for the DEA models with the Russell measures. In final section, we compare those models in case studies. 
Some DEA models with Russell measures
As mentioned before, those models are used widely to measure the non-radial part of efficiency for DMUs. It is also possible to introduce weights in the objective functions to express the relative importance of the inputs or outputs. However, these models do not increase their discrimination power in the sense that if a DMU is efficient in a standard DEA model with the radial measure, it also so with the Russel measures. What is more, it is clear that if a DMU is efficient in one of the above models then its component scores i  are all the unity even if one of the inputs or outputs does not really perform well relatively. To address these issues, other models with the Russell measures are introduced. The first example reads as follows (see Zhu (1996) , assume all the components of inputs/outputs are positive): Zhu (2009) has discussed these in detail.
The second example of the DEA models (Output-orientated) reads as follows (see Zhu(1996) ), assume all the components of inputs/outputs are positive): As explained in Zhu (1996), these two models mentioned above look like some minor extensions of the standard Russell DEA models to deal with wider applications.
In fact, they are quite different from the standard DEA models 2.1 and 2.2. The first indication can be seen from the following Table 2 .2, which represents the computation results for an example of Model 2.4.
It is clear that all the efficiency scores of the DMUs are less than the unity. Thus the DEA scores cannot be directly used as an efficiency measure as they do not satisfy the first axiom given in Fare and Lovell (1978) for a proper efficiency. This seems to indicate that there are some essential differences between the standard DEA models (with either the radial or Russell measures) and those models, which are important to guide proper uses of them and have not been systematically studied until now. 
the models with Russell measures and with slacks measures are in fact equivalent.
Thus here we introduce two additive models, which will be examined later and shown that they have many advances over Models 2.3-2.4. Let us note that in the input oriented model (2.5), the slacks for the inputs may be negative and so are those for outputs in Model (2.6). Thus they are closely related to Models (2.3-2.4). However, it will be shown later that they are in fact quite different from the viewpoint of the convexity and preferences of their PPS. Furthermore, if we constraint the slacks to be non-negative, they will boil down to Models (2. 
It is clear that P is convex. Then often we have to further expand this PPS by e.g.
free-disposability assumption. To this end we need define the so-called preferences or orders } { and } { . Then the so-called strongly free disposability assumption reads (or simply P is free-disposable):
Let us emphasize that these orders are not necessarily the Pareto preference -that is, } { or } { does not necessarily mean the component-wise inequalities as in the preference of Pareto (see below). Of course, in the classic DEA, the Pareto order is used, and } { and } { are just the standard vector inequalities " " , " " . Then PPS in the classic DEA models can be presented by
Then DEA models can be derived from this PS* as shown above. In the classic DEA framework, where } { and } { are understood in the preference of Pareto (i.e., inequalities in componets), it is easy to check that PS* is convex and free-disposable.
It has been realized however that some preferences other than the Pareto are useful in applications (Liu, et al. (2006) { is used, the PPS with the strong free-disposability has the following form:
However, now the set PS* may not be convex as to be seen later, and the strong free disposability cannot be described by the nonnegative slacks conditions (as in the case of the Pareto). It will become clear later that the different behaviors of the above models are reflected by convexity and free-disposability of their PPS in certain preferences. In order to fully address the origins of the differences, we will examine briefly some basic facts on preferences below.
Preferences and properties of PPS
A preference is a relationship defined for some pairs ) , ( y x on a set X , which can be denoted by } { and } { to represent "better than", and "worse than" (see Liu, et al. (1985) ), respectively. That is for all
then " x is at least as good as y "; if y x  , then " x is at most as good as y ". The definition of preference looks slightly abstract, but essentially it just clarifies the precise meanings for the vague expressions like "better, worse". Clearly one should have some understandings of these meanings before an evaluation is carried out via DEA. The most classic example is the numerical order (preference) for the real numbers like When there exist no other elements in X , which are better than an element x , it will be considered as "optimal or non-dominant" in X , although this does not really mean that it is better than the others in assigned preference like in the real numbers, since this could only mean there are many elements incomparable with it. In a sense, a standard DEA model is to find "optimal" DMUs in PPS under the Pareto preference, Most of the preferences used in applications are Reflexive: For all x in X , x x  , and Transitive: For all x , y , and z in X , if y x  and z y  , then z x  . These properties usually hold in real-life applications of DEA, and they are defined to make sure the mathematical summaries of the value judgments of DMUs are consistent. Another important property of a preference is compatibility for linear operation: that is to say, translations and multiplication by a positive number preserve the preference structure (Schaefer and Wolff (1999) ). We say: the preference " " is linearly compatible if :
There are other properties of preferences associated with the continuity, which relate to the openness or closeness of the PPS, and will not be discussed here.
Example 1: Pareto preference
The Pareto preference is by far the most widely used one in economic and management areas. We will keep using the usual inequality symbols " " , " " for this preference. Let ) , , ( Assuming the strong free-disposability in Pareto preference for inputs and outputs, then the standard PPS in DEA theory reads:
It is well-known that PS* is convex and free-disposable. The DEA models can be described by PS* and the measures to be used. Let us note that Models (2.1) and (2.2)
can be expressed as: 
then a DEA model can also be described by (if a Russell measure adopted): However for a general preference, is PS convex and free-disposable? Below we will show that the answer depends on some properties of the preference used in the PS.
Proposition 3.1:
If the preference used in PS is linearly compatible then PS is convex.
It is free-disposal if the preference is transitive.
The proof is obvious, so it is skipped here. Otherwise the set PS may be non-convex or non-free-disposable, if the preference used is non-transitive or not linearly compatible. Furthermore for the non-transitive preferences, there may be contradictive loops in the sense that there are DMUs It is clear that if PS is free-disposable in this weak sense then the resulting DEA model is the same as assuming the strong free-disposability.
PPS of DEA Models with Russell measures
Below we will examine the convexity and free-disposability of the PPS and the preferences used in the Models 2.1-2.6. It is clear that for Models 2.1-2.2, the preference used is the Pareto preference and thus their PPS are convex and free-disposable. Let us then examine whether it would be the same for the Models 2.3-2.6.
-output preference
Now we can identify the preference underlying the outputs of the model (2.4) as follows: . It is easy to verify that
does not hold. Furthermore there is a contradictive loop in this preference: 
Below we further show that due to the above defects, PS set may be non-convex and non-free-disposable. Let 
-input preference
Now we can identify the preference underlying the outputs of the model (2. 
Proof: We assume that there are p DMUs, whose inputs form a contradictive loop in -input preference. Assume that each DMU has m inputs, that is; Without losing generality, suppose , Then we have Since the product of all the items inside each pair of brackets is the unity, we have: ,,
And further note the well-known fact that the above equalities are true if and only if all the items inside the brackets are the unity. 
Thus we have Before we prove this theorem, we first need the following two lemmas. Consider the following two linear programming problems, The dual model of (4.6) reads (see Zhu (1996)): Here we begin to prove the Theorem 4.2. Firstly, consider the following Model. Here we know there are at least one DMU such that its efficiency score is the unity in the Model 4.9. Thus we have proved our conclusion.
Below we further show that PS may not be convex or free-disposable. Let
and consider all the vectors bigger than it:
It follows from the definition 4.2 2 12 12 ( , ) { ( , ) :
This is an area surrounded by the hyperbolic line: AS is also non free-disposable by noting this fact: let a, b be a point on the boundary of AS, then usually the set S(a, b) will contain points outside AS as usually the boundary of S(a, b) differs from that of AS. As there is no contradiction loop, it is free-disposable in the weak sense defined in Section 3.1. Now let us include outputs.
Firstly, in VRS case, let the output be the unity. Then it is clear that PS is a cylinder based on AS, between the planes y=0 and y=1. Thus it is non-convex and is non free-disposable. Thus we have given examples showing that the PS set of Model 2.3 may not be convex or free disposable. However, it is clear that PS set of Model 2.3 is better than that of Model 2.4 in the sense that it is only locally non-convex and it is weakly free-disposable. The above discussions hold for the case of CRS where PS is a cone starting from zero and the section cut by y=t is an area whose boundary is formed by the hyperbolic lines
, which all pass In what follows we will examine the PS sets of Models 2.5-2.6.
Total slack preferences
Firstly, let us define the following preference: Total output slack preference:
Obviously this preference is transitive and linearly compatible. The PPS with the total output slack preference reads: Similarly, we can define total input slack preference:
And the PPS with the total input slack preference reads: Thus, the optimal value of the above model is no less than that of Model 2.3. Note that there will always be at least one efficient DMU for Model 2.3. Thus, according to Theorem 4.2 at least one DMU's efficiency score calculated by Model 2.5 is the unity.
However, we cannot prove the same conclusion for Model 2.6 although computational results from random samples indicate it seems to hold as well.
Therefore, from the view point of preference these two models are more reliable to use. It follows from the above discussions that Model 2.3-2.6 are different from the standard ones in that they use different preferences either for input or output comparisons in their PPS. These preferences compare the performance of DMUs not in individual components of inputs or outputs (like Pareto) but in a sense of total performance. We will compare those models in the next section.
Example and Case Study
In this section, we intend to carry out some case studies to evaluate the The correlations among the results are as follows: Table 5 .4 for details. It is clear that the scores of the two models are very different. The differences in rankings are smaller but still significant. These will be discussed further below. The table shows one of the advantages to use the above models is that the performance differences in each component of the inputs or outputs can be clearly seen.
We now compare Models 2.1-2.6 with a DEA model in Liu et al. (2011) . When the standard DEA models are used in this data set, it was found that too many efficient DMUs were produced for an effective evaluation. Thus in the work of Liu et al.
(2011), a DEA Model 15 was specially designed for the evaluation, where some of the data are allowed to have direct substitutions, and was recommended to be used in future CAS research evaluation. Model 2.5-2.6 all seem to be able to produce consistent results in these empirical tests.
As discussed above, Model 2.4 is quite different from all others in terms of convexity and free-disposability, and should be avoided in real applications.
Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper we have studied and compared several DEA models in the Russell measures from the viewpoint of convexity and free-disposability of their PPS, resulted from the preferences used in the PPS. It is found that the standard Russell DEA models (Model 2.1-2.2) and the classic DEA models with the radial measure both uses the same preference (Pareto) in the PPS so that they are essentially the same models, although the classic Russell DEA models are able to measure the non-radial part of efficiency. However it is found in our studies that the -input, -output preference models (Model 2.3-2.4), and the total input slack, output slack preference models (Model 2.5-2.6) use the preferences very different from the Pareto either for input or output comparisons in their PPS. In the Pareto preference input/output A is better than input/output B if the components of A are all better than those of B, while in those preferences, this only needs a weaker condition that some total sums of the componets A is better than those of B. Thus the emphasis of these models is not to measure the non-radial part of efficiency, but some compensable sums of the relative measures of input/output components. Thus one uses them whenever one wishes to compare some total outcomes of input/output components, rather than their individual components.
We further show that the preference used in the PPS of Model 2.4 has contradiction circles, which cause theoretical difficulties in interoperating the results. We have also carried out empirical studies to compare these models and found that except the -output preference model (Model 2.4), they all produce consistent results. Thus we do not recommend using the -output preference model (Model 2.4). It is clear that the total input slack, output slack preference models are more reliable in the sense that their PPS are both convex and strongly free disposable.
